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Abstract
This paper examines the economic eﬀects of tax reform in an endogenous growth model
that allows for two types of useful public expenditures; one type contributes to human capital
formation while the other provides direct utility to households. We show that the optimal
ﬁscal policy calls for full expensing of private investment which shifts the tax base to private
consumption. The eﬃcient levels of public investment and public consumption relative to out-
put are uniquely pinned down by parameters that govern both technology and preferences. In
general, implementing the optimal ﬁscal policy requires a change in the size of government. If
a tax reform holds the size of government ﬁxed to satisfy a revenue-neutrality constraint, then
the reform will be suboptimal; theory alone cannot tell us if welfare will be improved. For
some calibrations of the model, we ﬁnd that commonly-proposed versions of revenue-neutral
tax reforms can result in large welfare gains. For other quite plausible calibrations, the exact
same reform can result in tiny or even negative welfare gains as the revenue-neutrality con-
straint becomes more severely binding. Comparing across calibrations, we ﬁnd that the welfare
rankings of various reforms can change, depending on parameter values. Overall, our results
highlight the uncertainty surrounding the potential welfare beneﬁts of fundamental U.S. tax
reform.
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In recent years, many policymakers and economists have advocated a consumption-based tax sys-
tem for the U.S. economy. The eﬃciency arguments for a consumption tax are drawn from optimal
tax theory. Under commonly-used assumptions, the theory supports the principle of uniform com-
modity taxation. When applied to a dynamic economy, this principle calls for the elimination of
saving distortions so that present and future consumption goods are taxed at the same rate.1 All
of the major consumption tax proposals are designed to be revenue-neutral. The intent is to im-
prove economic eﬃciency through changes in the tax code while leaving aside arguments about the
appropriate size of government.2
In this paper, we examine the potential welfare beneﬁts of some commonly-proposed tax reforms
in a model where public-sector expenditures can have a direct impact on private-sector production or
household utility. Once we allow for useful public expenditures, it follows that there is some optimal
level of public expenditures relative to output in the post-reform economy. Taking this logic one
step further, we are forced to confront the fact that switching to a revenue-neutral consumption tax
is inherently suboptimal because the reform optimizes over tax variables but not public expenditure
variables. In such an economy, adopting a revenue-neutral consumption tax would replace one
suboptimal ﬁscal policy with another; theory alone cannot tell us if welfare will be improved. We
demonstrate that this result is not just an abstract theoretical point–it has important quantitative
implications for U.S. tax reform.
There are many studies in the literature that examine the potential beneﬁts of adopting a
revenue-neutral consumption tax or some close variant thereof.3 These studies typically model
public expenditures as wholly exogenous variables that do not contribute to either production or
utility. As in the original Ramsey (1927) model, public expenditures are typically viewed as being
entirely wasteful; their only role is to determine how much revenue must be collected by the tax
system. Within this basic competitive framework, switching to a consumption tax while holding
revenue constant is guaranteed to improve welfare; the only question is the size of the resulting
welfare gain.
In this paper, we examine the economic eﬀects of tax reform in a model that departs from
the standard assumption of wasteful public expenditures. The framework for our analysis is a
tractable endogenous growth model with physical and human capital. The model allows for two
types of useful public expenditures; one type contributes to human capital formation while the other
provides direct utility to households. The inputs to the human capital technology are household
time (which gives rise to untaxed foregone earnings), private goods investment by households (such
as college tuition), and a government-provided input which we interpret as public expenditures
on education, job training, and research and development (R&D). A variety of empirical evidence
suggests that these types of public expenditures are productive.4
1The optimality of uniform commodity taxation can be overturned by deviating from assumptions of separable
utility in leisure, perfect competition, or complete markets. For a discussion, see Stern (1992).
2See, for example, Hall and Rabushka (1995, p. 34).
3See , for example, the two conference volumes: Frontiers of Tax Reform (Boskin 1996) and Economic Eﬀects of
Fundamental Tax Reform (Aaron and Gale 1996), and the two U.S. government publications: Joint Committee on
Taxation (1997) and U.S. Congressional Budget Oﬃce (1997).
4For evidence from U.S. states, see Evans and Karras (1994). For cross-country evidence, see Barro and Salai-i-
Martin (1995, p. 433). For a survey of empirical studies, see Gerson (1998).
1To establish a benchmark for comparing some commonly-proposed tax reforms, we compute the
optimal ﬁscal policy by endogenizing public expenditures and the government’s choice of the tax base
and tax rates. With regard to the tax base, the government can choose between a pure consumption
tax, a pure income tax, or some hybrid of the two systems.5 We show that the optimal ﬁscal policy
calls for full expensing of private investment which shifts the tax base to private consumption. The
eﬃcient levels of public investment and public consumption relative to output are uniquely pinned
down by parameters that govern both technology and preferences. In general, implementing the
optimal ﬁscal policy requires a change in the size of government. If a reform holds the size of
government ﬁxed to satisfy a revenue-neutrality constraint, then the reform will be suboptimal.
We undertake a quantitative assessment of these issues using a calibrated version of the model.
The calibration reﬂects the existing hybrid income-consumption tax system in the U.S. economy. We
begin by considering a series of consumption tax reforms that diﬀer according to their implications
for the post-reform size of government. The fully-optimal reform implements the optimal ﬁscal
policy which is determined by joint optimization of tax and spending variables. This experiment
establishes a useful upper-bound on the potential beneﬁts of tax reform in the model. The other
three experiments impose constraints on the post-reform size of government. The purpose of these
experiments is to explore how the beneﬁts of a consumption tax are aﬀected by the imposition of a
revenue-neutrality constraint.
We also examine two additional revenue-neutral reforms that are motivated by some elements
of real-world tax proposals. These are a “ﬂat tax” and an income tax. The ﬂat tax experiment
captures the point made by Judd (1998) that many consumption-based tax proposals would allow
full expensing of new investment in physical capital but not human capital. The income tax ex-
periment captures some features of historical tax legislation that has attempted to broaden the tax
base and reduce the dispersion of tax rates across alternative income-producing activities.
For our initial calibration, the fully-optimal reform calls for the government to devote more re-
sources to public investment and less resources to public consumption relative to the U.S. baseline.
The overall size of government is reduced as total public expenditures fall to 19.6% of output versus
21% in the baseline economy. In contrast, a revenue-neutral consumption tax reform maintains
public expenditures at 21% of output. We ﬁnd that the appropriate size and composition of govern-
ment expenditures is quite important for eﬃciency. The fully-optimal reform produces a net welfare
gain of 6.6% (measured in units of per-period private consumption) versus a gain of only 1.4% for
a revenue-neutral consumption tax. Intermediate welfare gains are obtained for consumption tax
reforms that adjust one type of public expenditures to achieve eﬃciency but not the other.
In addition to investigating the normative aspects of tax reform, we provide a complete descrip-
tion of the positive eﬀects, including computation of the transition paths for key macroeconomic
variables such as output growth, capital ratios, work eﬀort, schooling time, factor prices, and To-
bin’s q. By allowing full expensing of private investment, a consumption tax reform shrinks the tax
base relative to the baseline tax code which only allows for partial expensing. The smaller tax base
may necessitate a higher post-reform tax rate even if the reform reduces the size of government. A
higher post-reform tax rate initially discourages work eﬀort and schooling time thus leading to a
5Previous studies of optimal ﬁscal policy in human-capital based models allow the government to choose the tax
rates but not the tax base. See, for example, Lucas (1990), Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993), Corsetti and Roubini
(1996), Judd (1999), and Jones and Manuelli (1999).
2temporary reduction in output growth along the transition path. As the transition proceeds, work
eﬀort, schooling time, and output growth all rebound to higher levels as households accumulate
more capital in response to the reform’s investment incentives.
All of the reforms we consider exhibit relatively small growth eﬀects due to the form of the human
capital technology where untaxed foregone earnings represent the largest input to the production of
h u m a nc a p i t a l .W i t ht h ee x c e p t i o no ft h ei n c o m et a x, all of the reforms shift household resources
to investment and achieve long-run growth gains. The resulting transition dynamics can diﬀer
dramatically, however, leading to a wide range of welfare outcomes.
We explore the sensitivity of our results to a variety of calibrations for which the optimal size of
government can be either smaller or larger than the U.S. baseline. For some calibrations, adopting
a revenue-neutral consumption tax can result in tiny or even negative welfare gains. Under these
calibrations, the optimal size of government lies further below the U.S. baseline, thus causing the
revenue-neutrality constraint to become more severely binding. Comparing across calibrations, we
ﬁnd that the welfare rankings of various reforms can change, depending on parameter values. The
uncertainty that exists about the optimal size of government strengthens the main message of our
study; if policymakers do not know the eﬃcient level of public expenditures in the post-reform
economy, then they cannot know the degree to which the revenue-neutrality constraint will bind
when implementing a revenue-neutral tax reform. Overall, our results highlight the uncertainty
surrounding the potential welfare beneﬁts of fundamental U.S. tax reform.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The optimal
ﬁscal policy is derived in section 3. Section 4 describes our calibration procedure. Section 5 presents
our quantitative results. Section 6 presents our sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes.6
2 The Model
The model economy consists of households, ﬁrms, and the government. We allow for variable leisure,
investment adjustment costs, diﬀerential tax treatment of physical and human capital, and useful
public expenditures. Our choice of functional forms, inspired by the work of Hercowitz and Sampson
(1991), permits a closed-form solution of the model. The solution allows us to explicitly characterize
the economy’s transition path following a tax reform and to decompose the net welfare change into
three parts: a long-run level eﬀect, a long-run growth eﬀect, and a transition eﬀect. The model
also captures an important feature of consumer behavior observed during real-world tax reforms,
namely, a lack of an anticipation response. We will elaborate further on this point in our discussion
of the equilibrium decision rules.
2.1 The Household’s Problem




t {log[ct − V (ht,l t)] + Dlog(gt)}, β ∈ (0,1),D ≥ 0, (1)
6A technical appendix accompanies the web version of the article. The appendix provides details of the model
solution and our procedure for computing welfare changes.
3where β is the discount factor, ct is private consumption, lt is time devoted to non-leisure activities
(work or education), and ht is the household’s stock of human capital or knowledge. The disutilty
of non-leisure time is governed by the functional form
V (ht,l t)=Bhtl
γ
t B>0, γ > 0, (2)
which implies that foregone leisure is adjusted for “quality,” as measured by ht, reminiscent of the
models of Becker (1965) and Heckman (1976). Alternatively, we may interpret V (ht,l t) as the
reduced form of a more-elaborate speciﬁcation that incorporates home production.7 As γ →∞ ,
the model reduces to one with ﬁxed time allocations. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution
in labor supply is given by 1/(γ − 1).
We allow for the possibility that per capita public consumption goods gt provide direct utility
to households. Empirical studies by Karras (1994) and Amano and Wirjanto (1998) indicate that
one cannot reject the hypothesis of additive separability in private and public consumption. By
incorporating gt into the utility function, we ensure that public consumption will grow at the same
(endogenous) rate as output when ﬁscal policy is chosen by the government to maximize household
welfare. As a result, public consumption will continue to represent a signiﬁcant fraction of resources
as t →∞ . An alternative modeling strategy would be to set D =0and specify gt as some ﬁxed
fraction of output or of the capital stock. A problem with this strategy is that it creates a negative
externality; tax reforms that stimulate output growth will automatically increase gt and thereby
contribute to a drain on productive resources.8 Later, we show that this speciﬁcation can lead
to a substantial downward adjustment in the computed welfare gain from a growth-enhancing tax
reform, even when the growth eﬀect is small.
The household faces the following within-period budget constraint:
ct + ikt + iht = rtkt + wtht(lt − et) − τt [rtkt + wtht(lt − et) − φktikt − φhtiht], (3)
where ikt and iht represent investment in physical capital kt and human capital ht, respectively. We
interpret iht as private-sector expenditures on education, training, and R&D, that all contribute to
ab r o a d l y - d e ﬁned stock of knowledge. Given a total time endowment normalized to one, households
allocate their time across three activities: they supply labor eﬀort to ﬁrms in the amount lt − et,
devote time to human capital formation (learning) in the amount et, and spend the remainder of
their time 1 − lt in leisure.
Households obtain income by supplying capital and labor services to ﬁrms. They receive a
rental rate rt for each unit of physical capital used in production and earn a wage wt for each unit
of eﬀective labor ht(lt − et) employed by the ﬁrm. Taxable income in equation (3) is given by the
expression in square brackets.
Our analysis focuses on tax reforms that may involve diﬀerent trajectories for public-sector
expenditures, depending on whether the reform abides by a revenue-neutrality constraint. To aid
intuition, we have adopted a very transparent dynamic tax model that abstracts from many of
the details of the U.S. tax code. We assume that a single proportional tax rate τt is applied to
7The linearity of (2) in ht ensures that household time allocations are stationary along the model’s balanced
growth path. See Greenwood, Rogerson, and Wright (1995, p. 161).
8An externality of this sort is present in the endogenous growth models of Lucas (1990), Laitner (1995), and
Grüner and Heer (2000). These authors specify ﬁxed ratios of gt/ht or gt/yt, but then assume that gt is thrown
away.
4all taxable income, but allow for diﬀerential tax treatment of physical and human capital via the
policy variables φkt and φht. These represent the fractions of each type of investment that can be
“expensed,” or immediately deducted from taxable income.
For comparison with the U.S. tax system, φkt and φht can be interpreted as index numbers
that summarize the various elements of the tax code that encourage saving or investment. Features
that inﬂuence φkt include: the depreciation allowance for physical capital; the tax-deferred status
of saving done through pensions, 401(k)s, Keoughs, and IRAs; the favorable tax treatment of long-
term capital gains; and the relatively tax-free status of service ﬂows from owner-occupied housing.
Regarding φht, ﬁrms may expense the costs of formal worker training, the wages of workers engaged
in on-the-job training, job-related employee tuition, and expenditures for R&D. There is also a 20
percent tax credit for qualifying increases in R&D expenditures.9 The 1998 U.S. Federal budget law
introduced a variety of tax incentives designed to help individuals pay for higher education. These
include tax credits, penalty-free IRA withdrawals, and the deductibility of student loan interest.10
Earnings foregone while in school wthtet are implicitly expensed under the current tax code (see
Boskin, 1977) and would receive the same treatment under all proposed reforms.
The following equations describe the laws of motion for the two capital stocks:




kt,k 0 given, (4)







t,h 0 given, (5)
where A1,A 2 > 0, δi ∈ (0,1] for i = k,h,g,a n dν ≥ 0 .T h ea b o v es p e c i ﬁcations can be interpreted
as reﬂecting investment adjustment costs as in Lucas and Prescott (1971). Equation (4) implies that
households can add to their stock of physical capital in only one way: through goods investment
ikt.11 Equation (5) implies that human capital can be increased by private goods investment iht,
by the allocation of household time et, or by government goods investment igt. Including iht as an
input to the production of human capital has an eﬀect that is similar to including physical capital
kt because private goods must be produced using physical capital.12
We interpret igt as public-sector expenditures on education, job training, and R&D and assume
that igt,i ht, and et are complements in the production of human capital. The relevant public-
sector input in equation (5) is the per capita ﬂow of goods that the government makes available to
households. Specifying igt as a per capita quantity ensures that there are no scale eﬀects associated
with the number of households.
2.2 The Tax Base
The tax base under the current U.S. system is best described as a hybrid between income and
consumption such that φkt,φht ∈ (0,1). By choosing appropriate values for φkt and φht, we can
9For further details on the tax treatment of human capital, see Quigley and Smolensky (1990) and Steuerle (1996).
10See Hoxby (1998) for a detailed description and analysis of tax incentives for higher education.




t + δk (ikt/δk)1−σ¤1/(1−σ)
. Our setup implies σ =1 , whereas a linear law of motion with
no adjustment costs would imply σ =0 . Aside from reﬂecting adjustment costs, our setup can be viewed as capturing
the behavior of an aggregate capital stock that is measured by adding up diﬀerent types of capital (structures,
equipment, consumer durables, residential) which each display diﬀerent depreciation characteristics.
12Our setup assumes a clear distinction between private human-capital investment and private consumption.
Davies, Zeng, and Zhang (2000) consider a model where this distinction is not fully observable. They show that
t h ed e g r e eo fo b s e r v a b i l i t yc a na ﬀect the level of the optimal consumption tax.
5shift the tax base in our model to reﬂect various fundamental reforms. When φkt = φht =1
the tax structure is equivalent to a pure consumption tax at the rate τct = τt/(1 − τt).13 When
φkt = φht =0 , we have a pure income tax at the rate τt. An income tax favors human capital
over physical capital because foregone earnings while in school will continue to be fully expensed.
Finally, we can endogenize the tax base by allowing the government to choose φkt and φht, together
with the other ﬁscal policy variables, to maximize household welfare.
2.3 The Firm’s Problem
Output yt is produced by identical private ﬁrms that rent capital from households and hire eﬀective
labor ht(lt − et) in order to maximize proﬁts. The ﬁrm’s decision problem can be summarized as:
max
kt,h t(lt−et)
[yt − rtkt − wtht (lt − et)] (6)
subject to: yt = A0kθ
t [ht(lt − et)]
1−θ ,A 0 > 0, θ ∈ (0,1), (7)







ht (lt − et)
. (8b)
2.4 Household Decision Rules
Standard techniques yield the following expressions for the household’s optimal decision rules:








ct =( 1 − a0 − b0)(1 − τt)yt, (9c)


















where a0,b 0,A 3, and A4 represent combinations of deep parameters and yt is equilibrium per capita
output.14 By substituting equation (9d) into equation (7), we obtain the following expression for









t (1 − τt)
1−θ
θ+γ−1 . (10)
Household investment decisions depend on the eﬀective marginal tax rates τkt and τht which
combine the “statutory” tax rate τt with the investment expensing variables φkt and φht. Ac o n -
sumption tax implies φkt = φht =1such that τkt = τht =0 . A labor supply distortion will continue
13In this case, the household budget constraint (3) becomes: (1 + τct)ct + ikt + iht = rtkt + wtht(lt − et).
14Details are contained in the technical appendix that accompanies the web version of this article.
6to exist under a consumption tax, however, so long as γ < ∞. As γ →∞ , labor supply becomes
ﬁxed thus making a consumption tax equivalent to a lump-sum tax. All else equal, equation (10)
implies that per capita output (or income) is a decreasing function of the ratio ht/kt, a result that
stems from the labor decision rule (9d). The labor decision rule says that time devoted to market
work declines as the household acquires more human capital relative to physical capital. The educa-
tion decision rule (9e) says that time devoted to schooling or training also declines as the household
acquires more human capital relative to physical capital. Intuitively, these results obtain because
higher levels of human capital raise the opportunity cost of time that is not used for leisure.
Our choice of functional forms allows us to solve for the household decision rules without having
to specify how tax rates will evolve in the future. The combination of log utility and Cobb-Douglas
production technologies causes the income and substitution eﬀects of future after-tax interest rate
movements to exactly cancel so that households only need to observe the current state of the
economy in order to decide how much to consume and invest. Empirical studies provide some
support for this idea. For example, Poterba (1988) and Watanabe, Watababe, and Watanabe (2001)
ﬁnd evidence that large fractions of U.S. and Japanese consumers do not adjust their consumption
in anticipation of tax changes but instead wait until tax changes are implemented.
Most studies of tax reform assume that households are surprised by the change in tax policy.
This is not an innocent assumption. First, it represents somewhat of a contradiction to the notion
of rational expectations because household decision rules in the baseline economy are computed
for an environment where the current tax system is expected to remain in place forever. Second
and more importantly, it can strongly inﬂuence quantitative results. Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987,
pp. 82-87) show that preannouncing structural tax reforms can “greatly reduce if not reverse the
eﬃciency gains from such reforms.” In their model, preannouncement discourages saving as agents
take steps to avoid the one-time tax on existing wealth that occurs when shifting to a consumption
tax. These issues do not arise in our model because household decisions at time t do not depend
on future policy variables. Hence, preannouncing the reform would not change any of our results.
2.5 Transition Dynamics and Balanced Growth
Given the model’s tractable nature, we are able to explicitly characterize the economy’s dynamic
transition path for any set of initial conditions k0 and h0. By substituting the decision rules and

















ht+1 = A2 (A3A4)




















for all t ≥ 0, where yt is given by equation (10). The ﬁscal policy variables τkt, τht, τt, and igt can
all inﬂuence the transition path.
Our speciﬁcation of a goods-producing technology (7) that exhibits constant returns to scale in
7the two reproducible factors kt and ht, together with the functional forms (1), (4), and (5), imply
that the model possesses a unique balanced growth path.
Deﬁnition. (Balanced Growth). Balanced growth is when kt,h t,y t,c t,i kt,i ht,i gt, and gt all grow
at the same constant rate.
The above deﬁnition implies that the ratios ht/kt,i gt/yt, and gt/yt are constant along the
balanced growth path. From equations (11) and (12), we see that balanced growth can only occur
when τkt, τht, and τt are constant over time. To derive an expression for the per capita balanced
growth rate µ, we consider an environment where τkt = τk, τht = τh, τt = τ,i gt/yt = ψig > 0,
gt/yt = ψg > 0, and ht/kt = R>0. Variables without time subscripts represent constants for all t.
By taking logarithms of equations (11) and (12), we obtain two equivalent expressions for µ:
µ =l o g
kt+1
kt =l o g
ht+1
ht =l o g
yt+1











+ δk log(1 − τk)+
(1 − θ)δk















+ δh log(1 − τh)
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+ δg logψig, (14)
where the endogenous balanced-growth ratio R = ht/kt depends on a combination of deep parame-
ters and the ﬁscal policy parameters τ, τk, τh, and ψig.15
Our speciﬁcation of the human capital technology (5) helps to provide some insight into the
robustness of results reported in the literature regarding the eﬀects of distortionary taxes on long-
run growth. Models that omit goods investment in human-capital (either by households or the
government), or alternatively, assume ﬁxed time allocations, will shutdown some channels through
which ﬁscal policy can aﬀect growth. For example, Lucas (1990) ﬁnds that distortionary taxes have
very small growth eﬀects in a model where the only inputs to the production of human capital are
ht and household time. This case corresponds to our model with δh = δg =0 . In the models of King
and Rebelo (1990) and Kim (1998), the human-capital inputs are ht and iht. This case corresponds
to our model with ν = δg =0 . A commonly-used speciﬁcation is one where the human capital inputs
are ht,k t (or iht), and household time. This case corresponds to our model with δg =0 . Glomm
and Ravikumar (1998) allow public goods to contribute to human capital formation, but not private
goods. This case corresponds to our model with δh =0 .16 Our setup most closely resembles the
models of Corsetti and Roubini (1996) and Jones and Manuelli (1999) where the human capital
inputs are ht,k t (or iht), igt, and household time.
15The expression for R is derived in the technical appendix that accompanies the web version of this article.
16Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) further assume that leisure is ﬁxed, but allow households to allocate their non-
leisure time between market work and school.
83 Optimal Fiscal Policy
To establish a benchmark for comparing various reforms, we compute the optimal ﬁscal policy by
endogenizing public expenditures and the government’s choice of the tax base and tax rates. The
constraints on the government’s problem include the household decision rules, the laws of motion
for the two capital stocks, and the government budget constraint given by
igt + gt = τt (yt − φktikt − φhiht). (15)
Our speciﬁcation imposes a period-by-period balanced budget. Without such a restriction,
models of dynamic optimal ﬁscal policy typically imply that the government uses an initial capital
levy to acquire a stock of assets. The interest earned on these assets provides a nondistortionary
source of revenue to help ﬁnance future expenditures.17 It is doubtful, however, that such a policy
would be politically feasible as part of any real-world tax reform. In our view, a balanced-budget
environment represents a closer approximation to actual constraints than one which allows the
government to borrow or lend large amounts.18 Finally, our simple representative agent framework
abstracts from any redistributive transfers paid by the government.
The absence of household anticipation eﬀe c t si m p l i e st h a tt h eo p t i m a lﬁscal policy is time
consistent. Since household decisions at time t do not rely on any promises about future policy
actions, the government perceives no gain from reneging on a pre-announced plan. The solutions
to the government’s problem under commitment and discretion are the same.19
To compute the optimal ﬁscal policy, we use the equilibrium conditions to eliminate ct,l t,e t, φkt,
φht, and yt from the government’s problem so that the policymaker chooses {τt,i gt,g t,k t+1,h t+1,}
∞
t=0 .
Once known, these sequences can be used to recover the other variables.







t {log[d0 (1 − τt)yt]+Dlog(gt)}, (C1)
subject to









































t (1 − τt)
1−θ
θ+γ−1 ,
17See, for example, Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993).
18Period-by-period balanced budgets are used in the quantitative studies of Trostel (1993), Pecorino (1993, 1994),
Glomm and Ravikumar (1998), and Kim (1998). Other studies, such as King and Rebelo (1990), Devereux and Love
(1994), Stokey and Rebelo (1995), and Ortigueira (1998) assume that tax revenues are rebated to households in a
lump-sum manner. Finally, Lucas (1990), Laitner (1995), and Grüner and Heer (2000) impose constant ratios of
government debt to either human capital or output.
19Kydland and Prescott (1977, p. 476) note that optimal policies will be time consistent when agents’ current
decisions do not depend on future policy actions. For other examples where this occurs, see Xie (1997) and Lansing
(1999).
9with k0 and h0 given. The constant d0 represents a combination of deep parameters. We assign
the label C1 to this problem because the optimal policy turns out to be a consumption tax. The
closed-form solution to C1 is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (Optimal Fiscal Policy). The unique, time-invariant policy rules that maximize
household welfare are given by
τkt =0 ,o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,φkt =1 ,
















































1 − a0 − b0

,
for all t ≥ 0, where yt is given by equation (10).20
The optimal policy calls for full expensing of private investment which, as noted earlier, is equiv-
alent to a pure consumption tax. This result is consistent with a large public ﬁnance literature that
argues in favor of consumption taxes over income taxes. The eﬃcient levels of public expendi-
tures relative to output are uniquely pinned down by parameters that govern both technology and
preferences. The eﬃcient ratio of public to private investment in human capital is given by the
simple relationship igt/iht = δg/δh where δg and δh are the production elasticities for each type of
investment in the human capital technology (5).
Since the eﬃcient levels of public expenditures will generally diﬀer from those that prevail in the
baseline economy (except by chance), implementing the optimal ﬁs c a lp o l i c yw i l lr e q u i r eac h a n g e
in the size of government. If a proposed reform holds the size of government ﬁxed to satisfy a
revenue-neutrality constraint, then the reform will be suboptimal. Proposition 1 establishes this
point in a transparent way for an economy that allows for a realistic but limited disaggregation of
public expenditures. A more complete disaggregation would include such categories as health care
or infrastructure spending. That said, all we need for our main theoretical result to go through
is that there exists some eﬃcient level of public expenditures in the post-reform economy that
is determined by joint optimization of tax and spending variables. Given this basic premise, a
revenue-neutral tax reform will be rendered suboptimal.
4C a l i b r a t i o n
Parameter values and tax rates are chosen such that the model’s balanced growth path matches
various “facts” identiﬁed from empirical data. A time period in the model is taken to be one year.
We calibrate the pre-reform tax system to resemble the hybrid income-consumption tax system in
20Details of the proof are contained in the technical appendix that accompanies the web version of this article.
10the U.S. economy. As many authors have noted, the existing tax code already allows a signiﬁcant
portion of U.S. saving to escape distortionary taxation.
Our calibration strategy assumes that neither tax or spending variables are optimally chosen
initially–a reasonable assumption for the U.S. economy in our view. Hence we do not impose the
parameter restrictions implied by Proposition 1 when choosing values for δg and D. Instead, we
choose δg to match empirical estimates of the growth eﬀects of public-sector investment in education
and we choose D to match an empirical estimate of the marginal rate of substitution between public
and private consumption goods. Since other calibration strategies for δg and D could be used, we
examine the sensitivity of our results to alternative values of these parameters.
A cross-country study by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, table 12.3) regresses per capita output
growth on a large number of economic and demographic variables, including measures of GDP and
human capital. The estimated coeﬃcient on G-educ/Y (the 10-year average ratio of government
spending on education to GDP) is reported as 0.062 (standard error = 0.085) using a seemingly
unrelated regression technique and 0.229 (standard error = 0.109) using an instrumental variables
technique. For calibration purposes, we adopt a mid-range coeﬃcient of 0.1. In the model, the
eﬀect of an increase in igt/yt on per capita growth can be seen by dividing both sides of equation
(5) by ht, rearranging, and then taking logarithms to obtain




















For the postwar U.S. economy, government spending on education, training, and R&D has averaged
about 6 percent of GDP.21 Taking igt/yt = ψig =0 .06, we choose δg =0 .006 such that the baseline
model exhibits the property ∂µ/∂ (igt/yt)=δg/ψig =0 .1.
Aschauer (1985) estimates the degree of substitutability between public and private consumption
for a model where agents derive utility from a composite consumption good given by ct +αgt. This
speciﬁcation implies that the marginal rate of substitution between public and private consumption
is constant and equal to α. Aschauer’s estimates for α are in the range of 0.23 to 0.42. In contrast, the
utility function in our model is additively separable in the two types of consumption–a speciﬁcation
supported by the empirical studies of Karras (1994) and Amano and Wirjanto (1998).22 The within-
period utility function in our model can be written as








where we have made use of the equilibrium relationships ct − Bhtl
γ
t = d0 (1 − τt)yt and ct =
(1 − a0 − b0)(1− τt)yt. Equation (17) implies that the equilibrium marginal rate of substitution
between public and private consumption is given by D × (ct/gt). Our calibration procedure yields
ct/gt =3 .63 to match the corresponding average ratio in the U.S. economy. Using U.S. data from
1953 to 1994, Amano and Wirjanto (1998) estimate a utility speciﬁcation where the marginal rate
of substitution between public and private consumption is given by 0.49 ×(ct/gt)
0.64 . Substituting
21Data sources are as follows: Education expenditure data are from the Citibase series GAGEED & GAGEL
(public-sector) and GAESE (private-sector). R&D expenditure data are from National Science Foundation (1995,
table B-15 and p. 10). Physical capital and investment data are from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1998).
Total government expenditure data are from the Citibase series GGEQ.
22Karras (1994, fn 8) restimates Aschauer’s speciﬁcation but controls for autocorrelation of the error term. The
resulting point estimate for α is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Amano and Wirjanto (1998) estimate a more-
general utility speciﬁcation and reach similar conclusions.
11ct/gt =3 .63 into their expression yields a marginal rate of substitution of 1.12. Equating this ﬁgure
with the marginal rate of substitution implied by (17) yields D =0 .310 for our initial calibration.
Our sensitivity analysis examines alternative calibrations with larger and smaller values of D.
Empirical research indicates that the response of prime-age male labor supply to changes in
the after-tax wage is near zero. Females exhibit a larger labor supply response, particularly if one
considers adjustments along both intensive and extensive margins (see Eissa, 1996). Based on the
evidence, we choose γ =6which implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply
of (1 − γ)
−1 =0 .2. Later, we examine the sensitivity of our results to a more-elastic labor supply.
We choose θ =0 .36 to match the average share of capital income in U.S. GDP, as estimated
by Poterba (1997). The constants A0,A 1, and A2 are chosen to achieve the calibration targets of
µ =1 .80%,k t/yt =2 .6 and ht/kt =1 3 . Our measure of the U.S. physical capital stock includes
structures, equipment, consumer durables, and residential components. Our target for ht/kt is
based on the Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989, table 5.33) capital stock estimates which take into
account the imputed value of human capital in nonmarket activities such as school, leisure, or home
production.23
The elasticity parameters δk and δh are chosen so that the model matches the U.S. average
ratios of ikt/yt =0 .22 and iht/yt =0 .025. Consistent with our measure of physical capital, ikt
includes structures, equipment, consumers durables, and residential components.24 Our measure of
iht includes private-sector expenditures on education, training, and R&D.
We choose the discount factor β to achieve an after-tax interest rate of 4% based on the estimates
of Poterba (1997, table 1).25 The elasticity parameter ν in the human capital technology and the
household preference parameter B are chosen to achieve the balanced-growth time allocations of
et =0 .12 and lt − et =0 .17. These are the values estimated by Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993,
fn 2) for the U.S. economy.
We adopt Auerbach’s (1996, p. 51) estimate of τk =0 .16 to calibrate the baseline value of φk
because his estimate takes into account the eﬀective tax rates for both residential and nonresidential
capital. A diﬃcult parameter to pin down is φh, which represents the fraction of private goods
investment in human capital that is tax deductible. Recall that our measure of iht includes private-
sector expenditures on education, training, and R&D. Privately-funded R&D investment (which is
tax deductible) has averaged slightly more than 1% of GDP since 1954. Private expenditures for
education and training (which are mostly not tax deductible) are roughly the same magnitude. We
combine these observations to come up with an estimate of φh =0 .5. Later, we demonstrate that
our quantitative results are not very sensitive to changes in φh.
Finally, given the parameter values and calibration targets noted above, we solve for the tax
rate τ in the baseline economy such that the government budget constraint (15) is satisﬁed with
igt/yt = ψig =0 .06 and gt/yt = ψg =0 .15. These are the average ratios of public expenditures to
GDP in the U.S. economy. Table 1 summarizes the results of our calibration exercise.
23Studies that restrict their attention to market activities obtain estimates of ht/kt ≈ 3. See Davies and Whalley
(1991, Appendix) for a review of various studies that estimate the aggregate value of human capital.
24A standard linear law of motion for physical capital implies kt+1/kt =1−b δk +ikt/kt, whereb δk is the geometric
depreciation rate. Equating this expression to kt+1/kt from (4) and solving for b δk yields an eﬀective depreciation
rate of b δk =0 .066 along the model’s balanced-growth path.
25The after-tax interest rate ˆ r is deﬁned by introducing privately-issued real bonds (which exist in zero net supply)
into the household budget constaint. The balanced-growth version of the ﬁrst-order condition for bonds implies
ˆ r =e x p( µ − lnβ) − 1.
12Table 1: Initial Calibration.
Parameter Value Empirical Fact to Match
γ 6.000 Labor supply elasticity (γ − 1)
−1 =0 .2
θ 0.360 Average share of physical capital in output =0 .36
A0 0.232 Average per capita output growth µ =1 .80%
A1 1.173 Average kt/yt =2 .6
A2 1.139 Average ht/kt =1 3
δk 0.057 Average ikt/yt =0 .22
δh 0.002 Average iht/yt =0 .025
δg 0.006 Growth eﬀect of public expenditures ∂µ/∂ (igt/yt)=0 .1
β 0.979 After-tax interest rate =4 %
ν 0.029 Fraction of time in school or training et =0 .12
B 6.954 Fraction of time in market work lt − et =0 .17
D 0.310 Marginal rate of substitution between ct and gt =1 .12
φk 0.368 Eﬀective marginal tax rate τk =0 .16
φh 0.500 Fraction of tax deductible investment in human capital
ψig 0.060 Average igt/yt =0 .06
ψg 0.150 Average gt/yt =0 .15
τ 0.232 Average (igt + gt)/yt =0 .21
As a check on parameter values, we can compare some properties of the model to the ﬁndings










Eberly (1997, Table 1) estimates Tobin’s q using U.S. ﬁrm level data over the period 1981 to
1994. She obtains a mean estimate of 1.56 and a median estimate of 1.18. Comparing these
ﬁgures to equation (18) suggests that our model provides a reasonable portrayal of U.S. investment
fundamentals.
With φk =0 .368 and φh =0 .500, the baseline tax structure is slightly more favorable to human
capital when it comes to private goods investment. Our calibration implies that untaxed foregone
earnings represent 84% of the total costs (private and public) of producing human capital.26 Of the
privately-borne costs, only about 3% are not tax deductible.27 As a comparison, Clotfelter (1991,
p. 72) estimates that foregone earnings represent 49-79% of college education costs (tuition, room,
board, and foregone earnings) for males and 41-71% for females over various two-year periods from
1969 to 1988.28 Dupor, et al. (1996) estimate an upper bound of 8% for the share of privately-borne
costs which are not tax deductible.
5 Quantitative Eﬀects of Tax Reform
This section describes the positive and normative eﬀects of various tax reforms. We begin with
a comparison of four consumption tax reforms (labeled C1 through C4)t h a td i ﬀer according to
26Foregone earnings are given by wthtet. The total costs of producing human capital are given by wthtet+iht+igt.
For our calibration, wthtet/(wthtet + iht + igt)=0 .842.
27The privately-borne costs of producing human capital are given by wthtet +iht. The non tax deductible portion
of these costs are given by (1 − φh)iht. For our calibration, (1 − φh)iht/(wthtet + iht)=0 .026.
28Since government-provided ﬁnancial aid may help pay for college tuition, we interpret these ﬁg u r e sa sm e a s u r i n g
the ratio of foregone earnings to total (private and public) costs of producing human capital.
13their implications for the size of government. We then examine two additional revenue-neutral
reforms. Since tax policy can aﬀect the trend growth rate of all variables in our model, the concept
of revenue neutrality used here is a relative one. A revenue-neutral reform holds tax revenues (and
hence public-sector expenditures) ﬁxed relative to output.29
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the balanced-growth properties and the transition paths of the reforms.
Table 4 summarizes the welfare and growth eﬀects of the reforms.
5.1 Consumption Tax Reforms
The benchmark consumption tax reform, labeled C1, implements the optimal ﬁscal policy given
by Proposition 1. This experiment establishes an upper bound on the attainable welfare gains
from tax reform in the model. As noted earlier, the fully optimal reform calls for a change in
the size of government in order to achieve the eﬃcient ratios for igt/yt and gt/yt. We examine
the implications of deviating from the eﬃcient ratios by considering three suboptimal consumption
tax reforms, labeled C2,C 3, and C4. The C2 reform implements the eﬃcient ratio for igt/yt, but
maintains the baseline ratio gt/yt = ψg. The C3 reform maintains the baseline ratio igt/yt = ψig but
implements the eﬃcient ratio for gt/yt. The C4 reform satisﬁes our deﬁnition of revenue neutrality
by maintaining both baseline ratios igt/yt = ψig and gt/yt = ψg. Given the public expenditure
ratios implied by each suboptimal reform, we solve for the post-reform tax rate τ that satisﬁes the
government’s budget constraint (15) with φk = φh =1 .
5.1.1 Consumption Tax with Eﬃcient Public Expenditures
For the initial calibration, the eﬃcient public expenditure ratios from Proposition 1 are igt/yt =
0.094 and gt/yt =0 .102. The corresponding ratios in the baseline economy are igt/yt =0 .060 and
gt/yt =0 .150 (Table 2). The fully optimal reform calls for the government to devote more resources
to public investment and less resources to public consumption. This outcome is consistent with the
pro-growth nature of the reform. Overall, the C1 reform calls for a smaller size of government; total
public expenditures igt + gt fall to 19.6% of output from 21% in the baseline economy.
By allowing full-expensing of private investment (φk = φh =1 ) ,t h eC1 reform shrinks the tax
base relative to the baseline tax code which only allows for partial expensing. Thus, despite the
smaller size of government, the tax rate must be increased from τ =0 .232 in the baseline economy
to a post-reform value of τ =0 .277. Full expensing yields τk = τh =0which encourages private
investment. The balanced-growth ratio ikt/yt increases from 0.220 in the baseline economy to a
post-reform value of 0.262. The balanced-growth ratio iht/yt increases from 0.025 to 0.029.
With more resources devoted to investment (both public and private) the economy’s balanced
growth rate µ increases by 0.35 percentage points to 2.15%. All of the reforms we consider exhibit
relatively small growth eﬀects due to the form of the human capital technology where untaxed
foregone earnings represent the largest input to human capital production. The computed growth
eﬀects would have been even smaller if we had adopted a utility function with more curvature than
logarithmic (implying higher risk aversion). Small growth eﬀects from tax reform are consistent
29Altig et al. (2001) employ a similar deﬁnition of revenue neutrality by holding tax revenues ﬁxed when measured
in eﬀective units of labor. In our model, eﬀective labor is given by ht (lt − et), which grows at the same rate as
output along the economy’s balanced growth path.
14with the ﬁndings of many authors including Lucas (1990), Devereux and Love (1994), and Stokey
and Rebelo (1995).
The transition paths for selected variables are shown in the top panel of Table 3. In the very
short-run (corresponding to year 1), the higher post-reform tax rate τ discourages work eﬀort lt−et
and schooling time et which both fall by about 1%. The investment stimulus from the C1 reform
leads to an 18% ﬁrst-year increase in Tobin’s q. It takes time for the increased investment to raise
the capital stocks due to the form of equations (4) and (5) which imply investment adjustment
costs. In the short-run, the capital stocks cannot increase fast enough to compensate for the drop
in work eﬀort. This accounts for the temporary reduction in output growth to 1.08% in year 1.
By year 5, the capital stocks have had time to respond to the investment stimulus and we observe
output growth rebounding to 2.32%. Along the transition path, physical capital grows faster than
human capital which causes the ratio ht/kt to decline. The balanced-growth value of ht/kt is
inﬂuenced by the policy variables τ, τk, τh, and igt/yt. All four of these policy variables change
during the C1 reform. For this calibration, the eﬀect of a lower τk dominates the eﬀects of the other
t h r e ev a r i a b l e sa n dw eo b s e r v ead e c l i n ei nht/kt as the economy moves to a new balanced growth
path. The decline in ht/kt translates directly into a rise in the before-tax wage via equation (8b).
As the transition proceeds, the rising wage leads to a rebound in work eﬀort and schooling time.
The more-rapid growth of kt relative to ht causes the ratio kt/yt to increase along the transition
path. This translates directly into a decline in the before-tax rental rate rt via equation (8a). As
rt declines, households have less incentive to invest in physical capital and we observe Tobin’s q
falling as the transition proceeds beyond year 1. Ultimately, however, Tobin’s q ends up 6% above
its pre-reform value.
The welfare eﬀects of the C1 reform are shown in Table 4. Welfare eﬀects are measured by the
constant percentage change in per-period private consumption in the baseline economy that makes
the representative household indiﬀerent to the reform. We decompose the net welfare change into
three separate components: (1) a long-run level eﬀect linked directly to changes in the balanced-
growth values of ht/kt, τ, and gt/yt, (2) a long-run growth eﬀect linked directly to changes in the
balanced growth rate µ, and (3) a transition eﬀect deﬁned as the residual component of lifetime
utility computed by numerically simulating the transition path for 1500 periods.30

















which shows that the welfare eﬀects of any reform depend entirely on the resulting trajectories for
ct and gt. The trajectories are plotted in Figures 1 through 4 as deviations from the pre-reform
trend. To provide some intuition for the welfare results, Table 4 also reports the 100-year average
growth rates for ct and gt. The ﬁrst 100 years of the transition account for most of the contribution
to lifetime utility. The welfare rankings of the various reforms need not correspond one-for-one
with the magnitude of the average growth rates, however. This is because the average growth rates
depend only on the net changes in ct and gt over 100 years, whereas the welfare computation takes
into account the precise temporal patterns in ct and gt over the entire transition path.
30The details of the decomposition procedure are contained in the technical appendix that accompanies the web
version of this article.
15Table 4 shows that the C1 reform yields a net welfare gain of ∆Wnet =6 .59%,m e a s u r e di n
units of per-period private consumption. There is a large positive contribution from the long-run
growth eﬀect (22.1%) that outweighs smaller negative contributions from the long-run level eﬀect
and the transition eﬀect (−9.52% and −5.94%, respectively). The intuition for these results is
straightforward. By increasing the fraction of output devoted to public and private investment,
the C1 reform raises the economy’s balanced growth rate to 2.15%–the highest growth rate of any
reform we consider. This result accounts for the large contribution to welfare from the long-run
growth eﬀect. It is well known that even small changes in growth can have very large welfare
consequences because growth rates are compounded over many years. Regarding the long-run level
eﬀect, the C1 reform brings about a decline in the ht/kt ratio, an increase in the tax rate τ, and a
decline in the gt/yt ratio. All else equal, equation (10) implies that a lower ht/kt ratio raises the
long-run level of per capita output (or income) while a higher tax rate τ has the opposite eﬀect.
A higher tax rate also reduces disposable income which impacts private consumption directly via
the decision rule (9c). All else equal, a decline in the gt/yt ratio reduces long-run welfare whenever
D>0. The combination of these various elements yields a negative contribution from the long-run
level eﬀect. The transition eﬀect yields a negative contribution because households must initially
sacriﬁce consumption to accumulate the capital needed to support higher consumption in the future.
Both ct and gt undergo sharp drops in year 1 relative to their pre-reform trends as the C1 reform
shifts resources away from consumption towards investment (Figures 1 and 2). The 100-year average
growth rates for ct and gt are 2.12 % and 1.80%, respectively (Table 4). The average growth rate
for ct exceeds the baseline growth rate of 1.80% whereas the average growth rate for gt is just equal
to the baseline growth rate. Thus, despite the sharp drops in year 1, both types of consumption
recover by year 100 to meet or exceed the levels that would have prevailed without the reform.
5.1.2 Consumption Tax with Ineﬃcient Public Expenditures
The C2 reform implements the eﬃcient ratio igt/yt =0 .094 but maintains the baseline ratio gt/yt =
0.150. The reform calls for a larger size of government as total public expenditures rise to 24.4%
of output versus 21% in the baseline economy. The combination of a larger government and a
smaller tax base (from allowing full-expensing of investment) pushes up the post-reform tax rate
to τ =0 .344. The higher tax rate discourages work eﬀort and schooling time, leading to a smaller
long-run growth gain in comparison to the C1 reform. The C2 reform increases the economy’s
balanced growth rate by 0.28 percentage points to 2.08% versus a 0.35 percentage point gain under
the C1 reform. The transition path (Table 3) is qualitatively similar to that of the C1 reform but
output growth in year 1 drops more severely–to the point of actually turning negative. Again, this
is due to the higher post-reform tax rate which causes a larger short-run decline in work eﬀort and
schooling when the reform is implemented in year 1. The C2 reform produces a net welfare gain
of ∆Wnet =3 .24% versus a 6.59% gain for the C1 reform (Table 4). By maintaining the ineﬃcient
baseline ratio of gt/yt =0 .150,t h eC2 reform forgoes more than one-half of the available welfare
gain from shifting to a consumption tax. The intuition for this result can be seen in Figure 1. The
higher post-reform tax rate needed to maintain the baseline gt/yt r a t i ob r i n g sa b o u tal a r g ed r o pi n
ct relative to trend. This drop weighs heavily on lifetime utility because it occurs at the beginning
of the transition path. The 100-year average growth rates for ct and gt are 1.95% and 2.11%,
16respectively. The C2 reform is characterized by a higher average growth rate for gt because public
consumption does not undergo a sharp drop relative to trend when the reform is implemented.
The C3 reform maintains the baseline ratio igt/yt =0 .060 but implements the eﬃcient ratio
gt/yt =0 .102. The reform calls for a smaller size of government as total public expenditures fall
to 16.2% of output. Unlike the C1 reform, the eﬀect of a smaller government outweighs the eﬀect
of a smaller tax base thereby resulting in a lower post-reform tax rate of τ =0 .229. The slightly
lower tax rate imparts a mild stimulus to work eﬀort and schooling time in both the short-run
and long-run. Along the transition path, we now observe a small uptick in output growth to
1.84% in year 1. In the long-run, the C3 reform increases growth by 0.15 percentage points to
1.95%. The long-run growth gain is smaller in comparison to the two earlier reforms because the
C3 reform does not raise the fraction of output devoted to public investment in human capital–an
important contributor to growth. Despite the smaller growth change, the C3 reform produces a
net welfare gain of ∆Wnet =3 .73%, the second highest gain among all of the reforms. The welfare
decomposition reveals a positive contribution from the long-run level eﬀect (1.70%). This is due
to the combined eﬀects of a lower ht/kt ratio and a lower τ relative to the baseline economy. All
else equal, both elements serve to increase the long-run level of disposable income. In contrast, the
two earlier reforms are characterized by a lower ht/kt ratio and a higher τ relative to the baseline
economy, which have oﬀsetting eﬀects on the long-run level of disposable income. The 100-year
average growth rates for ct and gt are 2.02% and 1.64%, respectively.
Real-world tax proposals are often designed to be revenue-neutral. This reﬂects a tendency
on the part of policymakers to separate decisions about tax policy from decisions about public
expenditures (or public borrowing). The revenue-neutral C4 reform maintains both baseline ratios
igt/yt =0 .060 and gt/yt =0 .150. The full-expensing provision shrinks the tax base, requiring the
t a xr a t et ob ei n c r e a s e dt oτ =0 .296. The higher post-reform tax rate pushes down work eﬀort and
schooling time in the short-run and we observe a temporary slowdown in output growth to 0.76%
in year 1 (Table 3). In later years, work eﬀort and schooling time both recover in response to the
rising wage. The C4 reform increases the economy’s balanced growth rate by only 0.1 percentage
points to 1.90%, the smallest growth gain among the four consumption tax reforms. The growth
gain is smaller for two reasons: (1) because of the higher post-reform tax rate τ and (2) because the
reform does not raise the fraction of output devoted to public investment in human capital. The C4
reform produces a net welfare gain of ∆Wnet =1 .43%,o n l ya b o u to n e - ﬁfth as large as the 6.59%
gain produced by the fully-optimal C1 reform. Figure 1 again provides some intuition. The higher
post-reform tax rate under the C4 reform leads to an initial drop in ct relative to trend. Although
the initial drop is less severe than say, the C2 reform, the subsequent recovery of ct is less rapid
because the long-run growth gain from the C4 reform is very small–only 0.1 percentage points.
The 100-year average growth rate for ct is 1.85%, the lowest ﬁgure among the four consumption tax
reforms.
Taken together, the above experiments show that not all consumption tax reforms are created
equal; the beneﬁt so fas h i f t i n gt oac o n s u m p t i o nt a xa r es t r o n g l yi n ﬂuenced by assumptions about
the post-reform size of government. For our initial calibration, a reform that only implements the
eﬃcient gt/yt ratio yields a slightly larger net welfare gain (∆Wnet =3 .73% for the C3 reform) than
a reform that only implements the eﬃcient igt/yt ratio (∆Wnet =3 .24% for the C2 reform). Later,
we show that this ordering can be reversed for alternative calibrations.
175.2 Other Revenue-Neutral Reforms
5.2.1 Flat Tax
Judd (1998) notes that many consumption tax proposals are actually biased in favor of physical
capital. In particular, the “ﬂat tax” proposal of Hall and Rabushka (1995), calls for the immediate
expensing of new investment in physical capital, but contains no provisions to ensure equivalent
treatment of human capital. Expenditures by individuals on education would not be deductible from
taxable income under the Hall-Rabushka plan. In contrast, the Nunn-Dominici USA (unlimited
saving allowance) tax proposal includes a limited deduction for family expenditures on college
tuition, vocational training, or remedial education.31 Judd (1998) also points out that the Hall-
Rabushka proposal would actually eliminate some features of the tax code that appear to encourage
human-capital investment. These include the deductibility of charitable contributions to educational
institutions and the deductibility (for taxpayers who itemize) of state and local taxes–a fraction of
which is spent on public education. To capture these ideas, we consider a reform that allows full-
expensing for investment in physical capital but reduces the tax incentives for investment in human
capital. Speciﬁcally, our version of a ﬂat tax imposes φk =1and φh =0 .25. Given these values,
revenue neutrality is achieved by adjusting the post-reform tax rate τ to satisfy the government’s
budget constraint (15) after substituting in igt =0 .06yt and gt =0 .15yt.
Table 2 shows that the ﬂat tax is characterized by τ =0 .287, τk =0 , and τh =0 .232. Since
the ﬂat tax only allows for partial expensing of human-capital investment, the tax rate τ needed to
maintain revenue neutrality is lower than under the C4 reform. Despite the lower value of τ, the
ﬂat tax yields a smaller long-run growth gain of 0.06 percentage points versus 0.1 percentage points
for the C4 reform. This is due to the lower value of φh under the ﬂat tax which implies a smaller
tax incentive for private investment in human capital –a contributor to growth. The lower value
of φh relative to the baseline economy causes the ratio iht/yt to decrease from 0.025 in the baseline
economy to a post-reform value of 0.022. In contrast, this ratio increases from 0.025 to 0.029 under
the C4 reform. The impact of this diﬀerence on long-run growth is mild because non-deductible
private goods investment in human capital (1 − φh)iht accounts for only a small fraction of the
total costs of producing human capital in our model. The largest input to the production of human
capital is foregone earnings which is already implicitly expensed. Not surprisingly, therefore, the
transition path for the ﬂat tax is very similar to that of the C4 reform (Table 3, Figures 1 and 2).
T h en e tw e l f a r eg a i nf r o mi m p l e m e n t i n gt h eﬂat tax is ∆Wnet =1 .20%, only slightly less than
the gain of 1.43% produced by the C4 reform (Table 4). Overall, this experiment shows that the
expensing policy for private goods investment in human capital has only minor welfare and growth
consequences.
5.2.2 Income Tax
An income tax can be interpreted as capturing some elements of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86) which was designed to achieve a simpler and more eﬃcient federal tax system. TRA86
broadened the tax base by eliminating many tax breaks and substantially reduced the dispersion
of tax rates across alternative income-producing activities. Among other things, the act eliminated
31For details on the Nunn-Dominici plan, see Weidenbaum (1996).
18the investment tax credit (which had applied to equipment but not structures) and eliminated the
capital gains preference by taxing gains as ordinary income.32
In our model, an income tax is obtained by setting φk = φh =0which eliminates the tax
deductibility of private goods investment for both types of capital. Substituting these values into
the government’s budget constraint (15) together with the revenue-neutrality conditions igt =0 .06yt
and gt =0 .15yt yields τ =0 .21.
The broader tax base under an income tax allows for a lower post-reform tax rate; τ goes from a
baseline value of 0.232 to a post-reform value of 0.210. The lower value of τ induces an initial jump
in work eﬀort and schooling time and we observe a temporary increase in output growth to 2.13%
in year 1. Despite the lower value of τ, the non-deductibility of private goods investment results
in higher values for the eﬀective tax rates τk and τh. This feature of the reform accounts for the
decline in the ratios ikt/yt and iht/yt (Table 2). The dropoﬀ in private investment causes Tobin’s
q to decline by 6% in year 1. Since foregone earnings while in school continue to be fully expensed,
the income tax favors human capital as evidenced by the rising ht/kt ratio (Table 3).
Because it discourages private investment, the income tax lowers the economy’s balanced growth
rate by 0.04 percentage points to 1.76%. The welfare decomposition reveals negative contributions
from the long-run level eﬀect and the long-run growth eﬀect. The transition eﬀect yields a positive
contribution, however, because the reform stimulates consumption in the short-run at the expense
of investment. Overall, the net welfare change from the reform is ∆Wnet = −1.34% (Table 4) We
note, however, that our analysis abstracts from some potential beneﬁts of a simpliﬁed tax system,
such as improved taxpayer compliance or reduced administrative costs.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
Since our model, like many others, includes some parameters whose values are not precisely pinned
down by empirical studies, we wish to examine the sensitivity of the results to plausible changes
in these parameters. Speciﬁcally, we consider alternative values for the labor supply elasticity
(γ − 1)
−1, the human-capital production elasticity for public investment δg, and the utility para-
meter for public consumption D. The results of the sensitivity analysis are presented in Table 5.
For comparison, the upper left panel of the table reproduces the results for the initial calibration.
6.1 Labor Supply Elasticity
It is well-known that assumptions about the labor supply elasticity can inﬂuence the behavior of
dynamic tax models. To explore this issue, we consider an alternative calibration with (γ − 1)
−1 =
0.5. This elasticity is more than twice that of the baseline calibration but still within the range
of empirical estimates reported by some studies.33 To provide some intuition, Figure 3 plots the
eﬃcient public expenditure ratios over a range of elasticities.34 Both expenditure ratios decline as
labor supply becomes more elastic. This is because larger elasticities raise the distortionary costs
of collecting the tax revenue needed to ﬁnance the expenditures. The eﬃcient gt/yt ratio declines
32For additional description and analysis of TRA86, see the two symposia in Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Summer 1987 and Winter 1992.
33See, for example, Mulligan (1999).
34For each elasticity value plotted in Figure 3, we recalibrate the remaining parameters of the model to match the
empirical facts summarized in Table 1. A similar procedure is followed in constructing Figures 4 and 5.
19more gradually than the eﬃcient igt/yt ratio because the former directly contributes to household
utility.
When (γ − 1)
−1 =0 .5, the eﬃcient public expenditure ratios are igt/yt =0 .054 and gt/yt =
0.069. Relative to the baseline economy, the fully-optimal C1 reform now calls for a reduction in
both public expenditure ratios. The optimal size of government falls to 12.3% of output versus an
optimal size of 19.6% under the initial calibration. The reduction in the optimal size of government
leads to a lower post-reform tax rate (τ =0 .173) and a larger net welfare gain (∆Wnet =1 5 .8%) in
comparison to the initial calibration. Since the optimal size of government is now further below the
U.S. baseline, imposing revenue-neutrality can have signiﬁcant adverse welfare consequences. The
revenue-neutral C4 reform, which maintains the size of government at 21% of output, now produces
a net welfare loss of ∆Wnet = −0.71%. The C2 reform, which reduces the size of government slightly
to 20.4% of output, now produces a net welfare loss of ∆Wnet = −0.14%. Of the three suboptimal
consumption tax reforms, the C3 reform produces the largest net welfare gain (∆Wnet =1 5 .7%)
because this reform reduces the size of government to 12.9% of output–very close to the optimal
size of 12.3%.
As before, the results for the ﬂat tax are close to the C4 reform, but the welfare rankings are now
reversed. Under this calibration, the ﬂat tax yields a slightly better outcome than the C4 reform
(∆Wnet = −0.56% versus −0.71%), but both reforms still end up reducing welfare. The welfare
reversal is due to the lower post-reform tax rate τ aﬀorded by the ﬂat tax which takes on added
importance as labor supply become more elastic.
The welfare performance of the income tax actually improves with a more-elastic labor supply,
although the reform still produces a net loss of ∆Wnet = −1.10%. The improvement occurs because
the post-reform tax rate of τ =0 .210 now induces an larger initial jump in work eﬀort and hence a
larger early stimulus to consumption in comparison to the initial calibration.
6.2 Production Elasticity for Public Investment
Under the initial calibration, the eﬃcient public investment ratio igt/yt =0 .094 exceeds the U.S.
average ratio igt/yt =0 .06.W en o wc o n s i d e rt h eo p p o s i t ec a s ew h e r et h ee ﬃcient ratio lies below the
U.S. ratio. To achieve this outcome, we choose a smaller production elasticity for public investment,
δg =0 .0014, such that the eﬃcient public investment ratio is igt/yt =0 .026. In this way, we
m a i n t a i nt h es a m ea b s o l u t ed i s t a n c eb e t w e e nt h ee ﬃcient ratio and the U.S. ratio as under the
initial calibration. The baseline economy now exhibits the property ∂µ/∂ (igt/yt)=0 .023, which
falls within the 95% conﬁdence interval implied by the empirical estimates of Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995, table 12.3).
Figure 4 shows that smaller values of δg lower the eﬃcient igt/yt ratio but raise the eﬃcient
gt/yt ratio. The eﬀect of a lower igt/yt ratio dominates, however, such that the optimal size of
government falls to 14.4% of output versus an optimal size of 19.6% under the initial calibration
(which imposes δg =0 .006). Thus, as in the case of a more-elastic labor supply, the optimal size
of government is now further below the U.S. baseline in comparison to the initial calibration. Once
again, this causes the revenue neutrality constraint to become more severely binding.
The results are presented in the lower left panel of Table 5. Once again, we see that imposing
revenue-neutrality can exert a dramatic inﬂuence on the welfare eﬀects of shifting to a consumption
20tax. The fully-optimal C1 reform produces a net welfare gain of ∆Wnet =5 .27%, whereas the
revenue-neutral C4 reform yields only a tiny net gain of ∆Wnet =0 .07%. A reform that only
implements the eﬃcient igt/yt ratio yields a larger welfare gain (∆Wnet =4 .07% for the C2 reform)
than a reform that only implements the eﬃcient gt/yt ratio (∆Wnet =1 .78% for the C3 reform).
Recall that this ordering was reversed under the initial calibration.
Table 5 shows that all of the reforms exhibit smaller long-run growth changes relative to the
initial calibration. For example, the revenue-neutral C4 reform increases the economy’s balanced
growth rate by only 0.05 percentage points (to µ =1 .85%) versus a 0.10 percentage point growth
gain under the initial calibration. The explanation for this result can be seen in equation (14) where
smaller values of δg restrict some channels through which ﬁscal policy can aﬀect long-run growth.
6.3 Utility Parameter for Public Consumption
All of the previous calibrations share the feature that the optimal size of government is below the
U.S. baseline. We now examine the opposite case by imposing a larger value of D, the utility
parameter for public consumption. Speciﬁcally, we set D =0 .837 such that the eﬃcient public
consumption ratio is gt/yt =0 .198. T h i sv a l u em a i n t a i n st h es a m ea b s o l u t ed i s t a n c eb e t w e e nt h e
eﬃcient ratio and the U.S. ratio as under the initial calibration.35 Figure 5 shows that larger values
of D raise the eﬃcient gt/yt ratio but have no eﬀect on the eﬃcient igt/yt ratio. When D =0 .837,
the optimal size of government is 29.2% of output versus an optimal size of 19.6% under the initial
calibration (which imposes D =0 .310).
The fully-optimal C1 reform now produces a welfare gain of ∆Wnet =1 5 .7%. This ﬁgure is
considerably larger than the 6.59% gain obtained under the initial calibration. The enhanced
welfare gain is driven by a larger contribution from the long-run level eﬀect which in turn derives
from the higher gt/yt ratio and the larger value of D. As with the previous calibrations, imposing
revenue neutrality results in signiﬁcant foregone welfare gains. The revenue-neutral C4 reform now
produces a welfare gain of ∆Wnet =5 .59%, only about one-third the size of the gain produced by
the fully-optimal C1 reform.
With the exception of the income tax, all of the reforms exhibit improved welfare performance
relative to their counterparts under the initial calibration. The welfare performance of the income
tax deteriorates relative to the initial calibration: ∆Wnet = −2.94% versus −1.34% under the initial
calibration. The distinguishing feature of the income tax that accounts for this result is the reform’s
eﬀect on the long-run growth rate µ.T h ei n c o m et a xreduces µ whereas the other reforms increase
µ. For any given gt/yt ratio, reforms that stimulate output growth will automatically increase gt
which is more highly valued when D =0 .837 versus when D =0 .310.
Although not reported in Table 5, we also examined a calibration with D =0which implies that
public consumption is entirely wasteful. In this case, revenue-neutral reforms that stimulate growth
in yt will automatically increase gt and thereby contribute to a drain on productive resources. The
welfare-reducing consequences of this negative externality will be more pronounced for reforms that
yield higher growth in yt and hence gt. When D =0 , the revenue-neutral C4 reform produces
aw e l f a r eloss of ∆Wnet = −0.94%. This ﬁgure compares to a gain of ∆Wnet =1 .43% when
D =0 .310 and a gain of ∆Wnet =5 .59% when D =0 .837. In contrast, the welfare performance
35When D =0 .529, the eﬃcient public consumption ratio coincides exactly with the U.S. baseline ratio of gt/yt =
0.150. When D →∞ , the eﬃcient public consumption ratio from Proposition 1 is gt/yt =0 .434.
21o ft h ei n c o m et a xi m p r o v e sw h e nD =0because this reform reduces the growth rate of yt and
hence gt. When D =0 , the income tax produces a loss of ∆Wnet = −0.38%.T h i sﬁgure compares
to a loss of ∆Wnet = −1.34% when D =0 .310 and a loss of ∆Wnet = −2.94% when D =0 .837.
These experiments demonstrate that the practice of modeling gt as entirely wasteful while holding
these expenditures ﬁxed relative to the size of the economy can result in a substantial downward
adjustment to the computed welfare gain from a reform that increases the economy’s long-run
growth rate. We note that the studies of Lucas (1990), Laitner (1995), and Grüner and Heer (2000)
model gt as entirely wasteful while holding the ratios gt/ht or gt/yt ﬁxed. Hence, their welfare
computations for growth-enhancing capital tax reforms would appear to be biased downwards.
6.4 Discussion
The sensitivity analysis described above provides something akin to a conﬁdence interval for the
potential beneﬁts of tax reform in the model. By comparing across calibrations in Table 5, we see
that the potential beneﬁts of commonly-proposed reforms can vary over a wide range–and may
even turn negative. For example, the net welfare gain produced by a revenue-neutral consumption
tax reform (C4) ranges from a high of ∆Wnet =5 .59% to a low of ∆Wnet = −0.71%. The net welfare
gain produced by a revenue-neutral ﬂat tax reform ranges from a high of ∆Wnet =4 .70% t oal o w
of ∆Wnet = −0.56%. The net welfare gain produced by a revenue-neutral income tax reform ranges
from a high of ∆Wnet = −0.79% to a low of ∆Wnet = −2.94%. All of these results are derived using
a simple and transparent model.
The introduction of additional model features or parameters would likely contribute to an even
wider range of welfare results. Possibilities include a model version where long-run growth is ex-
ogenous or one that allows for more curvature in the within-period utility function. Based on the
quantitative results of Ortigueira (1998, Figure 2), both features would be expected to exert a strong
impact on the welfare costs of existing distortionary taxes in the baseline economy. Allowing for
variation of these model features in the sensitivity analysis would be expected to widen the range
of welfare eﬀects from a reform that alters the level and composition of distortionary taxes.
22Table 2: Balanced-Growth Properties of Tax Reforms
igt/yt gt/yt (igt + gt)/yt ττ k τh φk φh ct/yt ikt/yt iht/yt µ %
U.S. Baseline 0.060 0.150 0.210 0.232 0.160 0.131 0.368 0.500 0.545 0.220 0.025 1.80
Cons. Tax (C1) 0.094 0.102 0.196 0.277 0 0 1 1 0.513 0.262 0.029 2.15
Cons. Tax (C2) 0.094 0.150 0.244 0.344 0 0 1 1 0.465 0.262 0.029 2.08
Cons. Tax (C3) 0.060 0.102 0.162 0.229 0 0 1 1 0.547 0.262 0.029 1.95
Cons. Tax (C4) 0.060 0.150 0.210 0.296 0 0 1 1 0.499 0.262 0.029 1.90
Flat Tax (F) 0.060 0.150 0.210 0.287 0 0.232 1 0.250 0.506 0.262 0.022 1.86
Income Tax (I) 0.060 0.150 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210 0 0 0.560 0.207 0.023 1.76
Notes: C1 = fully optimal reform. igt/yt = ratio of public human-capital investment to output, gt/yt = ratio of public
consumption to output, τ = income tax rate, = τk = eﬀective tax re ate for physical-capital investment, τh = eﬀective tax rate
for human-capital investment, φk = fraction of tax deductible physical-capital investment, φh = fraction of tax deductible
human-capital investment, ct/yt = ratio of private consumption to output, ikt/yt = ratio of private physical-capital
investment to output, iht/yt = ratio of private human-capital investment to output, µ = per capita output growth.
Table 3: Transition Paths for Tax Reforms
Year ln(yt/yt−1) kt/yt ht/kt lt − et et wt/w0 rt/r0 Tobin’s qt/q0
U.S. Baseline 0 1.80% 2.60 13.0 0.170 0.120 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cons. Tax (C1) 1 1.08% 2.62 13.0 0.168 0.119 1.00 0.993 1.18
5 2.32% 2.66 12.7 0.168 0.119 1.01 0.977 1.16
10 2.29% 2.70 12.3 0.169 0.119 1.02 0.961 1.14
50 2.17% 2.87 11.2 0.170 0.120 1.06 0.908 1.08
∞ 2.15% 2.91 10.9 0.170 0.120 1.07 0.892 1.06
Cons. Tax (C2) 1 −0.08% 2.65 13.0 0.165 0.117 1.01 0.981 1.17
5 2.25% 2.69 12.7 0.165 0.117 1.02 0.966 1.15
10 2.22% 2.74 12.3 0.166 0.117 1.03 0.950 1.13
50 2.11% 2.90 11.2 0.167 0.118 1.06 0.896 1.07
∞ 2.08% 2.95 10.9 0.167 0.118 1.07 0.883 1.05
Cons. Tax (C3) 1 1.84% 2.60 13.0 0.170 0.120 1.00 1.00 1.19
5 2.19% 2.66 12.5 0.171 0.120 1.01 0.979 1.17
10 2.15% 2.72 12.1 0.171 0.121 1.03 0.957 1.14
50 1.99% 2.95 10.5 0.173 0.122 1.07 0.881 1.05
∞ 1.95% 3.01 10.1 0.173 0.122 1.09 0.863 1.03
Cons. Tax (C4) 1 0.76% 2.63 13.0 0.167 0.118 1.01 0.990 1.18
5 2.13% 2.69 12.5 0.168 0.118 1.02 0.968 1.15
10 2.09% 2.75 12.1 0.168 0.119 1.03 0.946 1.13
50 1.93% 2.98 10.5 0.170 0.120 1.08 0.872 1.04
∞ 1.89% 3.04 10.2 0.170 0.120 1.09 0.854 1.02
Flat Tax (F) 1 0.91% 2.62 13.0 0.168 0.118 1.01 0.991 1.18
5 2.11% 2.68 12.5 0.168 0.119 1.02 0.969 1.15
10 2.06% 2.75 12.0 0.169 0.119 1.03 0.946 1.13
50 1.90% 3.00 10.4 0.170 0.120 1.08 0.868 1.03
∞ 1.86% 3.06 10.0 0.171 0.120 1.10 0.849 1.01
Income Tax (I) 1 2.13% 2.59 13.0 0.171 0.121 0.998 1.00 0.94
5 1.68% 2.57 13.2 0.171 0.121 0.994 1.01 0.95
10 1.69% 2.55 13.3 0.171 0.120 0.990 1.02 0.96
50 1.74% 2.48 14.0 0.170 0.120 0.974 1.05 0.98
∞ 1.76% 2.46 14.1 0.170 0.120 0.970 1.06 0.99
Notes: C1 = fully optimal reform, ln(yt/yt−1)=per capita output growth in year t, kt/yt = ratio of
physical capital stock to output, ht/kt = ratio of human to physical capital stocks, lt − et = fraction
of time spent working, et = fraction of time spent in school/training, wt/w0 = before-tax real wage
relative to baseline, rt/r0 = before-tax rental rate relative to baseline, qt computed using equation (19).
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Eﬀect % ∆Wnet % ct gt
Cons. Tax (C1) −9.52 22.1 −5.94 6.59 2.12 1.80
Cons. Tax (C2) −9.00 17.9 −5.64 3.24 1.95 2.11
Cons. Tax (C3) 1.70 10.0 −7.98 3.73 2.02 1.64
Cons. Tax (C4) 2.98 6.16 −7.72 1.43 1.86 1.95
Flat Tax (F) 5.32 3.97 −8.10 1.20 1.85 1.92
Income Tax (I) −1.23 −2.58 2.47 −1.34 1.77 1.74
Notes: C1 = fully optimal reform. All simulations start from the balanced growth path of the baseline economy with
k0 =1and h0 =1 3and run for 1500 periods. The tax reform is implemented at t =1and maintained until the end
of the simulation. ∆Wnet = net welfare change measured by the constant percentage change in per-period private
consumption in the baseline economy that makes the household indiﬀerent to the tax reform. The decomposition of
∆Wnet is described in the appendix. 100-yr. ave. growth rate = log(c100/c0)/100 or log(g100/g0)/100.





τ igt/yt gt/yt ct/yt µ % ∆Wnet % τ igt/yt gt/yt ct/yt µ % ∆Wnet %
U.S. Baseline 0.232 0.060 0.150 0.545 1.80 – 0.232 0.060 0.150 0.545 1.80 –
Cons. Tax (C1) 0.277 0.094 0.102 0.513 2.15 6.59 0.173 0.054 0.069 0.586 2.22 15.8
Cons. Tax (C2) 0.344 0.094 0.150 0.465 2.08 3.24 0.287 0.054 0.150 0.505 1.90 −0.14
Cons. Tax (C3) 0.229 0.060 0.102 0.547 1.95 3.73 0.182 0.060 0.069 0.580 2.24 15.7
Cons. Tax (C4) 0.296 0.060 0.150 0.499 1.90 1.43 0.296 0.060 0.150 0.499 1.92 −0.71
Flat Tax (F) 0.287 0.060 0.150 0.506 1.86 1.20 0.289 0.060 0.150 0.504 1.90 −0.56





τ igt/yt gt/yt ct/yt µ % ∆Wnet % τ igt/yt gt/yt ct/yt µ % ∆Wnet %
U.S. Baseline 0.232 0.060 0.150 0.545 1.80 – 0.232 0.060 0.150 0.545 1.80 –
Cons. Tax (C1) 0.204 0.026 0.118 0.565 1.81 5.27 0.411 0.094 0.198 0.418 2.02 15.7
Cons. Tax (C2) 0.248 0.026 0.150 0.533 1.78 4.07 0.344 0.094 0.150 0.465 2.08 11.3
Cons. Tax (C3) 0.252 0.060 0.118 0.531 1.88 1.78 0.363 0.060 0.198 0.452 1.83 11.2
Cons. Tax (C4) 0.296 0.060 0.150 0.499 1.85 0.07 0.296 0.060 0.150 0.499 1.90 5.59
Flat Tax (F) 0.287 0.060 0.150 0.506 1.82 0.05 0.287 0.060 0.150 0.506 1.86 4.70
Income Tax (I) 0.210 0.060 0.150 0.560 1.77 −0.79 0.210 0.060 0.150 0.560 1.76 −2.94
Notes: C1 = fully optimal reform. More-elastic labor-supply: (γ − 1)
−1 =0 .5. Less-productive public investment:
δg =0 .0014. More utility from public consumption: D =0 .837. All other parameters are recalibrated to match
the empirical facts shown in Table 1. τ = income tax rate, igt/yt = ratio of public human-capital investment to
output, gt/yt = ratio of public consumption to output, ct/yt = ratio of private consumption to output, µ = per capita
output, ∆Wnet = net welfare change measured by the constant percentage change in per-period private consumption
in the baseline economy that makes the household indiﬀerent to the tax reform.
247C o n c l u s i o n
Most studies of tax reform do not consider how tax policy might interact with public expenditures
to inﬂuence welfare and growth. This is because public expenditures are typically assumed to
be exogenous variables that are entirely wasteful. In addition to being at odds with a variety of
empirical evidence, the idea that public expenditures have no economic value is hard to reconcile
with the sheer magnitude of public-sector activity in the U.S. economy.
The objective of this paper was to assess the economic eﬀects of fundamental tax reform using a
model that departs from the standard assumption of wasteful public expenditures. We showed that
if public expenditures are productive or provide direct utility to households, then a revenue-neutral
tax reform will replace one suboptimal policy with another; theory alone cannot tell us if welfare
will be improved.
In our model, a fully-optimal reform requires the government to tax private consumption and
adjust its spending to achieve the eﬃcient levels of public investment and public consumption
relative to output. The reform may call for the size of government to either shrink or expand,
depending on parameter values and the existing level of expenditures in the baseline economy.
Consumption tax reforms that deviate from the optimal size of government can result in signiﬁcant
foregone welfare gains. Under some calibrations, maintaining the pre-reform size of government
can even produce a net welfare loss. More generally, our results demonstrate that the beneﬁts of
shifting to a consumption tax are sensitive to assumptions about the post-reform trajectory of public
expenditures and the values of some key parameters that inﬂuence the optimal size of government.
In our view, this represents an important caveat to previous studies that have ignored the useful
nature of public expenditures.
The economic consequences of real-world tax reform will of course depend on additional factors
that our present model is not equipped to handle. These include the movement away from a
graduated-rate tax system (Cassou and Lansing 2004 and Caucutt et al. 2003), the role played
by the tax code in providing insurance against income uncertainty (Eaton and Rosen 1980, and
Hamilton 1987), and ﬁnally, distributional consequences (Altig et al. 2001 and Ventura 1999).
That said, our results illustrate the importance of taking into account both sides of the government’s
budget constraint when assessing the potential welfare beneﬁts of fundamental tax reform.
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28A Technical Appendix
This appendix provides details of the model solution and welfare computations presented in “Tax
Reform with Useful Public Expenditures,” J o u r n a lo fP u b l i cE c o n o m i cT h e o r y , forthcoming, by
Stephen P. Cassou and Kevin J. Lansing.
A.1 Household Decision Rules
The section derives the equilibrium decision rules for the representative household. The household
t a k e sf a c t o rp r i c e sa n dﬁscal policy variables as given. By solving equations (4) and (5) for ikt
and iht and substituting these expressions into equation (3), we obtain the following household















































where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (3). The transversality
conditions are limt→∞ β
tλtkt+1 =0and limt→∞ β
tλtht+1 =0 . The ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h ts i d e
of equation (A.1b) shows that households take into account the inﬂuence of human capital on the
amount of “quality adjusted” leisure. In particular, higher levels of human capital will raise the
opportunity cost of time which is not devoted to leisure.
The household decision rules are obtained using the method of undetermined coeﬃcients. First,















t = d0 (1 − τt)yt, (A.4)
(lt − et)=f0lt (A.5)
1where a0,b 0,d 0, and f0 are constants to be determined and yt is equilibrium per capita output. By
substituting the conjectured decision rules and the proﬁt maximization conditions (8a) and (8b) into















where ρ ≡ 1/β − 1 is the household’s rate of time preference. The coeﬃcients a0 and b0 can be
interpreted as marginal propensities to save out of after-tax income.
Substituting the expression for wt from equation (8b) into the ﬁrst order condition (A.1e), and
then making use of equations (A.3), (A.5), and (A.7) yields
f0 =
ρ + δh + δg + ν/γ
ρ + δh + δg + ν
. (A.8)
Substituting equation (A.8) back into equation (A.7) and solving for b0 yields
b0 =
(1 − θ)δh






A convenient property of the utility function (1) is that lt can be solved for independently of the
marginal utility of income λt. Substituting the expression for wt from equation (8b) into the ﬁrst



















Equation (A.10) can now be used to solve for (lt − et) and et using the conjectured relationships











































The next step is to verify that the conjectured forms of equations (A.2)-(A.5) are correct by
showing that d0 is in fact constant. We use the ﬁrst order condition for ct to obtain







= d0 (1 − τt)yt +
1 − θ
γf0
(1 − τt)yt, (A.13)
2where the second equality replaces Bhtl
γ
t by an equivalent expression that is obtained by combining
equations (A.1c) and (A.1d). Substituting equation (A.13), together with the conjectured decision
rules (A.2) and (A.3) into the household budget constraint (3) yields




w h i c hi sac o n s t a n ta n dt h u sv e r i ﬁes our conjecture. Finally, substituting the above expression for
d0 back into equation (A.13) yields
ct =( 1 − a0 − b0)(1− τt)yt, (A.15)
where (1 − a0 − b0) can be interpreted as the household’s marginal propensity to consume out of
after-tax income.
To derive an expression for the balanced growth ratio R = ht/kt, we consider an environment
where τkt = τk, τht = τh, τt = τ,i gt/yt = ψig > 0, and gt/yt = ψg > 0. Variables without
time subscripts represent constants for all t. Dividing equation (12) by equation (11) and imposing
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1 (Optimal Fiscal Policy)
T h eo b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o ni n(C1) is obtained by substituting ct−Bhtl
γ
t = d0 (1 − τt)yt from equation
(A.13) into the household utility function (1) to eliminate ct and lt. The government budget con-
straint in (C1) is obtained as follows. First, we use the investment decision rules (9a) and (9b) to
eliminate φkt and φht from equation (15) yielding:
igt + gt = yt [a0 + b0 + τt (1 − a0 − b0)] − ikt − iht. (A.17)
Next, we eliminate ikt and iht from equation (A.17) using the laws of motion (4) and (5) and
then eliminate et from the resulting expression using the decision rule (9e). To solve (C1),w eﬁrst
eliminate yt by substituting equation (10) into the objective function and the government budget




(θ + γ − 1)(1 − τt)
+ λgt
½
(1 − a0 − b0)yt − [a0 + b0 + τt (1 − a0 − b0)]
(1 − θ)yt
(θ + γ − 1)(1 − τt)
−
−ν iht












− λgt =0 , (A.18c)
kt+1 :
βθγ








[a0 + b0 + τt+1 (1 − a0 − b0)]
θγyt+1










β (1 − θ)(γ − 1)








[a0 + b0 + τt+1 (1 − a0 − b0)]
(1 − θ)(γ − 1) yt+1
(θ + γ − 1)ht+1
+




δh (θ + γ − 1)ht+1
¾
=0 , (A.18e)
for all t ≥ 0, where λgt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint.
The optimal policy rules are obtained by the method of undetermined coeﬃcients. First, we
note that (A.18b) implies igt =( δh/δg)iht for all t ≥ 0. Next, we conjecture that the remaining
policy rules take the form
ikt = a1yt, (A.19)
iht = b1yt, (A.20)
λ
−1
gt = d1yt, (A.21)
gt = f1yt, (A.22)
τt = τ, (A.23)
for all t ≥ 0, where a1,b 1,d 1,f 1, and τ are constants to be determined and yt is per capita output.
Substituting the conjectured policy rules into equations (A.18a), (A.18c), (A.18d), (A.18e), and




− (1 − a0 − b0)=−
ν
γδh







a0 + b0 =





b1 − d1 − τ (1 − a0 − b0), (A.24c)
a0 + b0 =
[(θ + γ − 1)(ρ + δh + δg)+θν]
(1 − θ)(γ − 1)δh
b1 − d1 − τ (1 − a0 − b0), (A.24d)
δg
δh
b1 + f1 = a0 + b0 + τ (1 − a0 − b0) − a1 − b1. (A.24e)
The linearity of the above system guarantees a unique solution to the government’s ﬁrst-order
4necessary conditions. Straightforward algebra yields
a1 = a0, (A.25)



















f1 = Dd1, (A.28)
τ =
(δg/δh)b0 + f1
1 − a0 − b0
, (A.29)
Since ikt = a1yt = a0 (1 − τkt)yt, equation (A.25) implies τkt =0or equivalently, φkt =1 .
Similarly, equation (A.26) implies τht =0or equivalently, φht =1 .
A.3 Welfare Computations
This section describes our procedure for computing the welfare results shown in Table 4. By making

















We wish to determine the constant percentage amount by which ct must be increased in the baseline
economy, with {gt}
∞
t=0 unchanged, in order to bring lifetime utility up to Vreform. Hence, we solve





















which implies x = exp[(Vreform − Vbaseline)(1− β)] −1 and ∆Wnet =1 0 0 x. For the simulations, we
use 1500 periods to approximate the inﬁnite horizon.
To facilitate a decomposition of ∆Wnet into its constituent parts, we use equations (A.13) and













































If the economy initially starts oﬀ on its balanced growth path, then ht/kt, τt, and gt/yt must
be constant (see Deﬁnition 1) and we can write ht = h0eµt, where µ is the balanced growth rate
5given by equation (13) or (14). With these restrictions, equation (A.32) can be used to obtain the



























where we drop the time subscripts from h/k and g/y because these ratios are constant in the long-
run. Equation (A.33) shows that the long-run level eﬀect is linked directly to the values of h/k, τ,
and g/y, whereas the long-run growth eﬀect is linked directly to the balanced growth rate µ.
To compute the steady-state welfare change (which ignores transition dynamics), we imagine an
instantaneous jump from the baseline values of h/k, τ, g/y, and µ to those implied by the reform,
holding h0 constant. Implicitly, we are treating kt as a jump variable for this computation. The
change in steady-state welfare is deﬁned as
∆Wss =1 0 0
©
exp







where ¯ Vreform and ¯ Vbaseline are computed using equation (A.33). We can further decompose ∆Wss
into two parts attributable to each of the two terms in equation (A.33) that we label as the long-run
level eﬀect and the long-run growth eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, we solve for x1 and x2 such that
1+x1 + x2 =1 + ∆Wss/100,
=e x p
£









∆¯ V2 (1 − β)
¤
,
=( 1 + a) × (1 + b),
=1 + a + b + ab, (A.35)
where ∆¯ Vss = ¯ Vreform − ¯ Vbaseline = ∆¯ V1 + ∆¯ V2 and we deﬁne a ≡ exp
£





∆¯ V2 (1 − β)
¤
− 1. A reasonable (although not unique) solution to this decomposition
problem is x1 = a + ab{|a|/(|a| + |b|)} and x2 = b + ab{|b|/(|a| + |b|)}. Given ∆Wnet (computed
from the numerical simulation) and ∆Wss (computed above), we deﬁne the transition eﬀect as the
residual: ∆Wtransition = ∆Wnet − ∆Wss.
6